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ISSUES IN BRIEF
Human activities are contributing to climate change. Fossil fuel combustion in particular 
contributes to increased levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) in the atmosphere. With increased GHG levels come rising average land and ocean 
temperatures, rising sea levels, loss of biodiversity, and increasing severity and frequency of 
storms, floods, and droughts (US EPA 2014). 
The international climate change regime focuses mainly on the reduction of GHG emissions 
to stymie the above-mentioned effects. This effort is facilitated through the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a convention that relies on state 
actors to meet state GHG emissions reduction targets through state-determined means. 
This framework maintains maximum sovereignty by granting flexibility to state emissions 
mitigation approaches by allowing a state to let its individual situation determine what areas 
are most feasible to mitigate. As a part of that maintenance of sovereignty, individual sectors 
are generally not mentioned in 
UNFCCC agreements. There are  
two exceptions to this sectoral 
exclusion, however: aviation  
and maritime shipping. 
There is nothing more important 
to the global economy than 
international trade, and maritime 
shipping is the common carrier of 
that trade. Ninety percent of all trade by volume is transported by ship and it is speculated 
that without maritime shipping, half the world might starve while the other half might freeze 
(ICS 2015). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) describes shipping as “perhaps 
the most international of all the world’s great industries” (IMO 2016), which might also make 
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it the most complex. International vessels that have intricate webs of multi-state ownership 
traverse the global commons of the high seas carrying goods that have been produced or 
extracted in piecemeal all over the world for delivery to national and international markets. 
There is virtually nothing about this industry that is not international. 
This level of integration complicates matters considering this single industry is also responsible 
for the production of nearly three percent of total world CO2 emissions (IMO 2016). This 
number may not seem like much on its own, but these emissions rival those of the fifth largest 
emitting nation (CAIT 2016). Furthermore, nearly 100 percent of these ocean-going vessels use 
bunker fuel, a viscous petroleum product that is relatively inexpensive, making it attractive to an 
industry where fuel accounts for up to 60 percent of operating costs (Corbett and Winebrake 
2008). However, bunker fuel combustion results in higher levels of emissions than other fuel oils 
due to the high viscosity and level of impurities. While top emitting nations are setting goals to 
cap or reduce emissions in the very near future, marine shipping emissions are continuing to rise 
and are expected to increase to 6–14 percent of the global share by 2050 (Darby 2016). 
The Unanswered Question: Who “Owns” Shipping Emissions?
There can be little doubt that international marine shipping is contributing to climate change 
in an increasing capacity, but what is being done to address these substantial emissions? 
Although aviation and marine shipping are the only sectors to be specifically included in 
climate change agreements on a global level, the international community approaches 
the mitigation of these emissions with ambiguity and increasingly evident hesitation. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommended in 1994 that “emissions 
from international aviation and marine bunker fuels should be calculated as part of the 
national GHG inventories of Parties (to the UNFCCC) but should be excluded from national 
totals and reported separately because of their international nature” (IPCC 1996). This 
recommendation is contradictory as it suggests that bunker fuel emissions both be counted 
and not counted nationally. This also implies that parties can and should address emissions 
from any sector except international shipping as these emissions are removed from national 
totals, thus national reduction obligations. This recommendation leaves in its wake the 
burning question: who, exactly, is responsible for these emissions?     
In 1997, parties to the UNFCCC answered this question by naming the IMO as the responsible 
body in the text of the Kyoto Protocol by stating that: 
the Parties included in Annex I (developed countries) shall pursue limitation or reduction 
of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation 
and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization 
and the International Maritime Organization, respectively (Kyoto Protocol 1997). 
This mention of shipping within the text of the Kyoto Protocol solidified a seemingly 
permanent relationship between the IMO and the UNFCCC where the IMO is charged with an 
ambiguous guardianship of international marine emissions by aiding states in their reduction 
of emissions in the most international of sectors. However, marine shipping and aviation 
are both conspicuously absent in the 2012 extension to the Kyoto Protocol as well as the 
historic 2015 Paris Agreement. The IMO presented only at a “side event” at the Paris climate 
negotiations, a clear signal that shipping emissions do not enjoy a pressing priority in the 
international climate change regime. 
Besides the absence of a direct reference to marine shipping in the Paris Agreement, there 
is also a distinct lack of action to mitigate bunker fuel emissions since 1997 on part of the 
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IMO. In fact, the continuous “progress” that the IMO has reported at each conference of the 
parties (COP) since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol did not take tangible shape until 2011 
when a chapter was added to an existing convention that implemented mandatory efficiency 
measures for all new ships 400 gross tons or above, which covers virtually all international 
cargo vessels (MARPOL Annex VI Chapter 4). The IMO hails this as the “first legally binding 
climate change treaty to be adopted since the Kyoto Protocol” and it is expected to reduce 
CO2 emissions by up to 26 percent by 2030 compared to business as usual (IMO 2016). As 
good as this may sound, international shipping emissions are still expected to increase 50 to 
250 percent by 2050 despite efficiency gains (IMO 2016). This is due to the projected increase 
in international trade in nearly every country, which is being driven by a deepening integration 
and specialization of markets; a process which is itself enhanced by the convenience and low 
cost of maritime shipping. In October 2016, IMO members agreed upon a plan to adopt an 
initial strategy to reduce maritime emissions by 2018. No solid plan had been defined as of 
March 2017. 
Even more troubling is that besides a few fringe examples, there is nothing published by the 
IMO, academia, NGOs, governments, or otherwise to suggest that viable policy, operational, 
or technological alternatives exist or are being developed to aid the target GHG reductions.  
It seems as though the crux of this vast and global problem of both innovation and mitigation 
deficiencies rests on the issue of emissions ownership. 
As it stands, the IMO has been put in charge of this enormous and important mitigation task 
by the UNFCCC. The IMO is a logical choice, as it is a UN body that specializes in all things 
maritime, and this choice does receive a considerable amount of support from governments, 
the private sector and NGOs (ICS 2015; K. Metcalf, personal communication 2016; S. Raptis, 
personal communication 2016). However, the IMO is the smallest specialized UN agency, 
has no enforcement mechanisms, has very little funding or staff, and is comprised of state 
participants (although some state representatives are from the private sector), and depends 
on state actions and enforcement. 
While the IMO may be a logical choice to facilitate emission reductions in international 
shipping, it is not at all a logical choice to develop, implement, and enforce anything beyond 
efficiency measures, measures which are near universally 
supported because of the cost saving aspect. Further action 
must be completed by states because we live in a world of 
states: the UNFCCC has state parties, the IMO has member 
states, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement use state 
emission reduction targets, and the Kyoto Protocol suggests 
that states work through the IMO to reduce emissions. 
Because of this entrenched state system, international shipping 
emissions can no longer remain stateless if meaningful 
reductions are to be made. 
State Allocation Options: A Continuing Dilemma
Yet, a state cannot include shipping emissions in their reduction targets if the international 
community cannot figure out how these emissions should be allocated to states. In fact, 
Christiana Figueres, the former Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, stated that emissions from 
international vessels are not even covered under the legalities of the convention simply because 
they are not national emissions (personal communication 2016). This is an issue that parties 
“ ... a state cannot include shipping 
emissions in their reduction targets 
if the international community 
cannot figure out how these 
emissions should be allocated ...”
to the UNFCCC have grappled with from the onset, almost immediately upon recognizing the 
unique nature of shipping emissions in 1994. Twenty-three years later, there is still no answer. 
At COP1 in Berlin in 1995, Parties to the UNFCCC devised allocation options for 
consideration, four of which are still being discussed:
1.  Allocation to the country where the bunker fuel is sold;
2.  Allocation to the country of departure or destination of the vessel;
3.  Allocation to the country of departure or destination of the passengers or cargo; and
4.   Allocation to the country of the transporting company, the country of the operator,  
or the country of registration of the vessel (SBSTA 1996).
Since 1997, parties have not seriously discussed the issue of state allocation in UNFCCC 
meetings. It must be actively revisited to achieve a downward trend in shipping emissions. 
As discussed below, each option for state allocation dramatically differs in its political and 
geographical ramifications in terms of which corners of the globe would bear the burden of 
the responsibility of production, and thus mitigation.
Allocation option 1 places the burden of responsibility on the states that sell the greatest 
amount of bunker fuel. The data in Figure 1 is from the International Energy Agency (IEA).  
As illustrated, the burden of responsibility falls heavily on the United States and Singapore and 
excludes all states colored in gray from all measure of responsibility, although it is certain that 
all states benefit from international shipping in some fashion. This metric does not take into 
account the fact that Singapore is a convenient bunkering point on routes that pass through 
the Strait of Malacca and not necessarily a dominant or direct participant in international 
trade in other metrics. The U.S. is accurately represented as a leader in this metric as it is also 
a leader in international trade.
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Figure 1: Emissions per Country Based on Amount of Bunker Fuel Purchased, 2012
 0.003 – 3.98
 3.981 – 12.93 
 12.931 – 28.46
 28.461 – 48.83 
 48.831 – 131.56
 CO2 in million metric tons
Source: Map created by the author using ArcGIS Reference Layers Database; IEA Projection; GCS_WGS_1984.
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Allocation option 2 is slightly flexible, allowing for either the country of departure or 
destination of the vessel to be held responsible for mitigating emissions. However, this option 
is problematic when one considers that a vessel does not necessarily make a neat route from 
Port A to Port B and back again. A vessel might instead stop at six ports between the origin 
and destination, ports and states that would not be accounted for in this option. 
Allocation option 3 attempts to fill in some of the holes in option 2 by placing responsibility 
on the country of the departure or destination of cargo. All the stops along the route from Port 
A to Port B would be accounted for in this option if cargo is loaded or unloaded at any port. 
Table 1 (option 3) shows the contrast in geographic responsibility compared with Figure 1 
(option 1). Here, seven and six out of the top 10 largest ports by shipping volume (as measured 
by trailer equivalent, or TEU, and by kiloton, respectively) are located in China, which would 
render the East Asian country overwhelmingly responsible for mitigating emissions. The port in 
Rotterdam dominates the European continent and the Middle East and Australia appear for the 
first time as leaders in TEU and kiloton volume, respectively. South America, Africa, and North 
America do not have ports that rank at all with this metric, although based on WTO statistics 
for 2014, the U.S. ranks number one in the world for imports and number two for exports, not 
just ship cargo (WTO 2016). The differentiation between imports and exports, thus producers 
and consumers, is not made in this metric and precise data on imports and exports via ship by 
volume per country are unavailable, even by the ship data expert, Lloyd’s List.
Table 1: Largest Ports by Volume, 2014
Port TEU,* millions Port Kilotons
Shanghai, China 35.29 Shanghai, China 678,376
Singapore 33.87 Singapore 581,268
Shenzhen, China 24.03 Guangzhou, China 500,975
Hong Kong, China 22.23 Qingdao, China 465,055
Ningbo-Zhoushan, China 19.45 Port Hedland, Australia 446,922
Busan, South Korea 18.65 Tianjin, China 445,780
Qingdao, China 16.62 Rotterdam, Netherlands 444,733
Guangzhou Harbor, China 16.16 Ningbo, China 429,912
Jebel Ali, Dubai, UAE 15.25 Dalian, China 337,366
Tianjin, China 14.05 Busan, South Korea 335,411
Source: World Shipping Council 2017.   *Trailer Equivalent Unit
Allocation option 4 holds within it the most geographically diverse suite of options by listing 
three in one, which are discussed separately here. Option 4(a) states that the country where 
the shipping company is located should be responsible for mitigating shipping emissions. This 
would clearly be Europe for both TEU and deadweight ton (DWT) capacity as Tables 2A and 2B 
list on the following page, as four out of the top 10 owner countries are European, the largest 
being Denmark for TEUs and Greece for DWT. Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and China also 
appear as leaders in both metrics with the U.S. appearing as the eighth largest country by DWT 
capacity. South America, Africa, and Australia do not appear in this metric at all. 
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Allocation option 4(b) places responsibility for shipping emissions on the country where the 
ship operator resides. A ship operator is essentially a management company either within or 
contracted by the shipping company that is responsible for the oversight of all technical and 
operational tasks of a vessel. Data on this metric are expensive and elusive as ship operators 
tend to be more ambiguous, service-based entities, but while there is some overlap with the 
largest shipping companies, the largest ship operators appear to be located in Singapore, 
China, Taiwan, Japan, the Middle East, Europe, and even the U.S. (Heitmann and Khalilian 
2010). While not evenly spread across the Northern Hemisphere, it is the most even distribution 
presented in these five allocation options. 
Finally, allocation option 4(c), listed in Table 3, places the burden of responsibility on the 
flagging country. Already, flagging states are the entities that are ultimately responsible for 
the enforcement of all international maritime rules and regulations. As shown in Table 3, this 
is the only metric that highlights the developing world. Central America, Africa and Polynesia 
appear for the first time, as Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands are the top three 
flagging countries by share of the world in DWT capacity, with Singapore, China and the small 
islands of the Bahamas following closely behind. While this metric enjoys precedence within 
the IMO, it might also be the least effective if employed as is. 
Inconvenient Truths about Flags of Convenience
What we know today as “flags of convenience” is an unintended consequence of early 20th 
century Prohibition in the U.S. when American cruise liners began to flag their vessels in the 
Bahamas to be able to continue to serve alcohol to their passengers (DeSombre 2006). After 
Congress repealed Prohibition in 1933, ship owners continued the practice as they found 
other benefits such as lower overhead costs as a result of less stringent regulations and the 
www.bu.edu/pardee
Table 3: Top 10 Flagging Countries 
by Percentage of World Total, 2015
Table 2A: Top 10 Countries with 
Largest Shipping Companies by 
Volume, 2015
Country (Company)
TEU* in  
millions
Denmark (Maersk) 2.5
Switzerland (MSC) 2.5
France (CMA CGM) 1.5
Taiwan (Evergreen) 1.0
China (COSCO) 0.9
China (China Shipping) 0.8
Germany (Hapag-Lloyd) 0.7
South Korea (Hanjin) 0.6
Japan (Mitsui OSK) 0.6
Singapore (APL) 0.5
Country
DWT** in 
millions
Greece 279.4
Japan 230.7
China 157.6
Germany 122.0
Singapore 84.0
South Korea 80.2
Hong Kong (China) 75.3
United States 60.3
United Kingdom 48.4
Norway 46.4
Table 2B: Top 10 Countries with 
Largest Aggregated Shipping Load 
by Weight, 2015
Country
DWT** by  
percent
Panama 20.13
Liberia 11.65
Marshall Islands 10.02
Hong Kong (China) 8.62
Singapore 6.58
Malta 4.69
Greece 4.50
Bahamas 4.33
China 4.33
Cyprus 1.92
Source: UNCTAD 2015     *Trailer Equivalent Unit     **Deadweight tonnage
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ability to employ cheaper labor. The flag determines the “nationality” of a vessel and “which 
domestic and international laws they are subject to...A ship registered to Panama is legally 
considered to be a Panamanian ship even if the owner is American, and even if it never sails 
to Panama, and the only rules it needs to follow are those that Panama imposes” (DeSombre 
2016). Flagging fees represent a considerable source of income for developing countries. 
Panama, for example, a country with only one national fleet line of its own and a limited 
presence in international trade, earns approximately $500 million annually from flagging 
fees (DeSombre 2006). While open registries may provide an economic boon to developing 
countries, the result is that nearly 77 percent of the international fleet is registered to countries 
that have no obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, only future commitments under the Paris 
Agreement, and a comparatively limited capacity to enforce international rules and regulations. 
Moreover, a flag can be changed to another country within a matter of hours, rendering 
responsibility under this metric even more elusive.
A striking example of the limited enforcement capacity of flagging countries and the inability of 
the IMO to compel such enforcement is seen with the oil tanker Prestige. This particular vessel 
flew a Bahamian flag, had a Greek captain, a Filipino and Romanian crew, was registered in 
Liberia, owned by a Swiss company that was itself owned by Russian nationals, was carrying oil 
from Latvia to Singapore, classified by the U.S., and insured by the United Kingdom (DeSombre 
2006). When the ship sank in 2002, causing the largest oil spill in both Spain and Portugal’s 
histories, the 11 countries that had stakes in this one vessel pointed fingers at each other with 
no one party taking responsibility. As this exemplifies, the flag state is not always willing or able 
to take responsibility and the IMO did not step in to force the Bahamian hand. The Prestige 
also exemplifies the great need to be able to say with certainty who and what is responsible for 
all matters pertaining to ships so that catastrophes of all sorts may be mitigated. If that party 
is to be the flagging state, then mechanisms need to be put into place to ensure responsibility 
is carried through and to either provide support to countries that may need assistance in 
enforcement or preventing countries from offering open registries. 
Conclusion
As the allocation map and tables exemplify, there is no easy answer, nor is there a common 
denominator that can be easily extracted from the allocation options to identify responsibility 
for shipping emissions. Without state allocation, as has been the case for more than two 
decades, it is nearly impossible to meaningfully reduce emissions from maritime shipping, 
a sector that will continue to increase its contributions to global emissions as trade among 
countries of the world continues and grows. Because responsibility for emissions remains 
unassigned, states are not able or willing to prioritize the creation of an environment that 
might induce innovation in shipping technology or operations. As policymakers and scientists 
have realized, however, even if all parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement meet their nationally 
determined emissions targets — targets which exclude shipping — the world will not be able to 
limit the planet’s increasing surface temperatures to well below 2 degrees Celsius. Every percent 
of emissions reductions counts and every sector should be included. Without proper incentives 
for states to include these emissions in their state totals beyond it being the “right thing to do,” 
the complexity of allocation will continue to remain a barrier to any further mitigation action.  
Shipping — the most integrated and global of all sectors — should not continue to be left out 
of a state-run system. If any GHG reduction targets are ever to be met, responsibility must be 
assigned, innovation must occur, emissions reductions must take place, and shipping must be 
included in the international effort to limit climate change. •
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